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COMMONWEALTH v. MAGUIRE
I. INTRODUCTION
In Commonwealth v. Maguire,l the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held that MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 233, section 2P
gave a trial court reviewable discretion to exclude or admit evidence of
prior convictions intended to impeach a criminal defendant on the
stand. 3 The court, in expressly overruling Commonwealth v. West,4
.which held that trial courts have no discretion concerning the admis
sion of prior convictions under chapter 233, section 21,s professed a
concern about fairness to the defendant if the trial court were to lack
reviewable discretion. 6 The Maguire court agreed, therefore, to hear
"seasonably raised challenges"7 to the trial court's discretion in admit
ting prior convictions, testing the abuse of that discretion by weighing
the probative value against the possibility of prejudice to the defend
ant. 8 The court, however, applied the test deferentially to the case at
bar,9 demonstrating that the seemingly broad rule created in the case
is likely to be limited in its application. \0
Lawrence Maguire, the defendant, was tried on charges of aggra
vated rape of one woman and assault with intent to rape another.ll
1. 392 Mass. 466, 467 N.E.2d 112 (1984).
2. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21 (West 1959 & Supp. 1984) reads in part:
''The conviction of a witness of a crime may be shown to affect his credibility." Id. (empha
sis added).
3. 392 Mass. at 470, 467 N.E.2d at 115.
4. 357 Mass. 245, 258 N.E.2d 22 (1970).
5. Id. at 249, 258 N.E.2d at 24.
6. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 469-70, 467 N.E.2d at 114-15.
7. Id. at 470, 467 N.E.2d at 115.
8. Id. The inquiry focuses on abuse of discretion. The balancing test is the same test
a trial court should use before it admits the convictions. See Maguire, 392 Mass. at 469,
467 N.E.2d at 114-15.
9. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 470-71,467 N.E.2d at 115-16. See infra notes 73-75 and
accompanying text.
10. "Limited" refers to the actual exclusion of prior convictions at the trial level.
Most convictions will probably be admissible under the rule to impeach the defendant and
very few will be considered prejudicial so long as the trial court uses limiting instructions to
.reduce the impact. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text; see also Spencer v. Texas,
385 U,s. 554, 561 (1967). But see Commonwealth v. DiMarzo, 364 Mass. 669,681, 308
N.E.2d 538, 546 (1974) (Hennessey, J.,concurring) (effectiveness of limiting instructions
used to avert prejudice questionable).
11. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 467, 467 N.E.2d at 113. The defendant was also indicted
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When he testified in his defense, the prosecution impeached him with
evidence of a prior sex-related conviction. 12 The defendant moved to
exclude the evidence l3 but the trial court denied the motion. 14 The
trial judge did, however, give two separate limiting instructions to the
jury about the conviction. 1s After a long trial and four days of deliber
ation, the jury found Maguire guilty on all charges. 16
The defendant appealed, presenting two significant questions to
the supreme judicial court: (1) is a trial court's discretion to admit or
exclude prior convictions, described as a non-reviewable right in Com
monwealth v. Diaz,17 reviewable by an appellate court;18 and (2) if so,
what standard of review should be applied?19 The court also con
fronted another issue that the defendant's appeal had not raised: Does
a trial court in Massachusetts have the discretion to exclude prior
convictions?20
II. THE DECISION

The court began its opinion by addressing the latter unspoken
question. Although the issue of whether the trial court has discretion
when prior convictions are involved was arguably settled by the hold
ings in Commonwealth v. Chase 21 and Commonwealth v. Diaz,22 the
on related charges of assault and battery during the aggravated rape and of breaking and
entering during the attempted rape. Id. at 467 n.l, 467 N.E.2d at 113 n.1.
12. Id. at 467, 467 N.E.2d at 113. The prior conviction was under MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 16 (West 1970), for open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior
in front of four women. The defendant paid a fine of $250 upon conviction. Maguire, 392
Mass. at 467, 471, 467 N.E.2d at 113, 115.
13. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 470-71, 467 N.E.2d at 115. The motion was made in
limine and denied by the trial court before the defendant testified. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 467, 467 N.E.2d at 113. The trial court instructed the jury that the convic
tion was introduced and admitted solely on the issue of the defendant's credibility both
immediately after it admitted the evidence and again when it gave the charge. Id.
16. Id at 466-67, 467 N.E.2d at 113.
17. 383 Mass. 73, 80, 417 N.E.2d 950, 955 (1981).
18. See Maguire, 392 Mass. at 467, 467 N.E.2d at 113.
19. See id. at 470, 467 N.E.2d at 115. The defendant also argued that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying a jury request for a transcript of the testimony of one
witness and in excluding a report written by the same witness. Id. The Maguire court
found no merit in the defendant's contentions, dismissing the trial court rulings as straight
forward evidence rulings at the end of the opinion. Id. at 472-73,467 N.E.2d at 116-17.
20. Prior opinions interpreting the rule set out in chapter 233, section 21 never actu
ally addressed the question. Before Maguire, the supreme judicial court avoided reinter
preting chapter 233, section 21 by terming the discretionary authority as a "right" to
exclude prior convictions. See infra text accompanying notes 23-29.
21. 372 Mass. 736, 363 N.E.2d 1105 (1977).
22. 383 Mass. 73,417 N.E.2d 950 (1981).
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court felt the need to address it in light of West's holding that the
language in chapter 233, section 21 referred to the admission of prior
convictions as an option of the cross-examining party, not as a matter
of trial court discretion. 23 The Chase court had held that West still
applied to most situations,24 but had also stated that the trial court
possessed a "right" to exclude evidence of prior convictions if the like
lihood of intense prejudice to the defendant due to the convictions cre
ated a question of unfairness. 25 The Diaz court expanded on the Chase
position, casting the "right" in terms of an absolute, nonreviewable
decision by the trial court. 26 A more recent case, Commonwealth v.
Knight,27 baldly stated that "judges now have discretion to preclude
the use of prior convictions to impeach a defendant's credibility."28
Although all these decisions seem to contradict West, their holdings
created an exception to the West rule instead of overruling it. 29
Perhaps recognizing the anomaly in its prior decisions, the
supreme judicial court in Maguire launched into a justification of giv
ing trial courts discretionary authority to exclude prior convictions as
evidence for impeachment uses 30 before reaching the merits of the
case. Pointing out that most states adhere to Federal Rule of Evidence
23. West, 357 Mass. at 249, 258 N.E.2d at 24. The Maguire court effectively ad
dressed the issue of trial court discretion first by laying out the West holding and then
discrediting it with a subsequent discussion of the attractiveness of recognizing trial court
discretionary authority to exclude prior convictions. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 467-69, 467
N.E.2d at 113-15. The West court reasoned that because the defendant was a witness on
the stand when he testified, he was as open to cross-examination and impeachment as any
other witness. West, 357 Mass. at 249, 258 N.E.2d at 24. The West court then stated that
the use of prior convictions was one of many options available to the cross-examining party
for impeaching a witness. Id. The court, consequently, held that chapter 233, section 21
referred to that option, not trial court discretion. Id.
24. Chase, 372 Mass. at 749-50, 363 N.E.2d at 1114.
25. Id. at 750, 363 N.E.2d at 1114-15.
26. Diaz, 383 Mass. at 80, 417 N.E.2d at 955.
27. 392 Mass. 192,465 N.E.2d 771 (1984).
28. Id. at 194,465 N.E.2d at 773.
29. The Chase court discussed West as a general rule to follow, claiming that the only
exception to it was when the likelihood of prejudice was intense. Chase, 372 Mass. at 749
50,363 N.E.2d at 1114-15. Specifically, the court stated: "[W]e would not deny the right
of a judge to avoid any question of unfairness by excluding [prior convictions] where the
likely prejudice to the defendant is most intense." Id. at 750,363 N.E.2d at 1114-15. Con
stitutional concerns of due process seem to underlie the exception, although the Chase
court did not feel they applied to the case at bar. Id. at 751, 363 N.E.2d at 1115. The Diaz
court cited to West in passing, relying primarily on Chase for support. Diaz, 383 Mass. at
80, 417 N.E.2d at 954. By the time Knight was decided, this example of the exception
emasculating the rule was firmly entrenched in Massachusetts case law. See Common
wealth v. King, 391 Mass. 691,463 N.E.2d 1168 (1984).
30. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 468-69, 467 N.E.2d at 114.
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609(a),31 the court concluded that previously it had effectively granted
discretion to Massachusetts trial courts. 32 The court noted with ap
proval that trial court discretion avoided prejudice to the defendant
either when the conviction and the charge were substantially similar33
or when the prior conviction did not affect untruthfulness. 34 The
court also observed that trial court discretion aided the fact-finder by
encouraging the defendant to testify.35 The Maguire court then ad
dressed the issues raised in the defendant's appeal. Although the court
did not find constitutional problems with a lack of appellate review of
discretion to admit prior convictions,36 its concern with fairness to the
defendant led it to overrule West expressly37 and to reinterpret the
language of chapter 233, section 21 to allow the trial court reviewable
discretion. 38 The court then established a standard for review that fo
cused on balancing the probative value of the prior conviction against
the likelihood of unfair prejUdice to the defendant. 39
Applying its standard to the facts before it, the court found no
abuse of discretion. 4O It held that the trial court averted prejudice to
31. Id. at 468 & nn.2-6, 467 N.E.2d at 114 & nn.2-6. The court noted that most
states have adopted a position similar to Rule 609(a), granting the trial court discretion in
admitting prior convictions either by statute, by rule, or by court decision. Id. at 468-69,
467 N.E.2d at 114. Footnotes 2 through 6 on the cited pages of the decision provide an
extensive list of cases, statutes, and rules in which the adoption of Rule 609(a) can be found
and portray the method by which the rule was incorporated into state law. See Maguire,
392 Mass. at 468 & nn.2-6, 467 N.E.2d at 114 & nn.2-6. See also 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, EVIDENCE 1) 609[12], at 609-109 to 609-137 (1982 & Supp. 1984).
32. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 469, 467 N.E.2d at 114.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 469, 467 N.E.2d at 115.
36. Id. at 470,467 N.E.2d at 115. The primary authority for the lack of concern lies
in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). In Spencer, the United States Supreme Court
considered a due process challenge to the use of prior convictions for impeachment of a
defendant in a murder case under a Texas statute authorizing the use of the convictions.
The Spencer court held that, because of the legitimate state purpose in using prior convic
tions for impeachment and the guard against prejudice through the use of limiting instruc
tions, no due process problem existed. Spencer, 385 U.S. at 561. Although the Spencer
court also discussed discretion of the trial court as a factor in averting prejUdice, id., this
has been dismissed as dicta in federal court interpretations of Spencer. See United States v.
Belt, 514 F.2d 837, 848-50 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Dixon v. United States, 287 A.2d 89, 94 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied 407 U.S. 926 (1972). See also Leno v. Gaughan, 664 F.2d 314,
315 (1st Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
37. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 469-70, 467 N.E.2d at 114-15. "Fairness" has been an
overriding concern in other prior Massachusetts cases as well. See Commonwealth v.
Chase, 372 Mass. 736, 750, 363 N.E.2d 1105, 1114-15 (1977); Commonwealth v. DiMarzo,
364 Mass. 669, 678, 308 N.E.2d 538, 544 (1974) (Hennessey, J., concurring).
38. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 470, 467 N.E.2d at 115.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 470-71,467 N.E.2d at 115-16.
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the defendant through the use of two limiting instructions41 and noted
that the prosecutor did not misuse the conviction. 42 The court also
concluded that since the prior conviction was not the result of a seri
ous offense43 and was a sex-related crime,44 it was not substantially
similar to a serious, violence-related crime such as rape. 45 Finding no
abuse of discretion or substantial likelihood of unfair prejudice, the
supreme judicial court affirmed the conviction. 46

III.

ANALYSIS

In creating the Maguire rule, the supreme judicial court brought
Massachusetts into accord with a majority ofjurisdictions in the coun
try.47 The court moved away from the position that the status of crim
inal defendants did not entitle them to special protection from their
prior convictions when they testify48 to the position that the right of
defendants to a fair trial entitled them to trial court scrutiny of their
prior convictions and perhaps appellate scrutiny as wel1. 49 In essence,
the latter position matches the one taken by Federal Rule of Evidence
609(a) and states that adopted it. 50 In substance, however, the new
Massachusetts rule differs significantly from Rule 609(a) and its
progeny.
The language in Rule 609(a) establishes more restrictive bounda
ries than the rule announced in the Maguire opinion. Rule 609(a) de
lineates a general rule that most convictions are admissible to impeach
41. Id. at 470, 467 N.E.2d at 115.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 471, 467 N.E.2d at 116.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 473, 467 N.E.2d at 116-17.
47. See id. at 468-69 & nn.2-6, 467 N.E.2d at 114 & nn.2-6. See also WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 31, ~ 609[12], at 609-109 to 609-137.
48. Commonwealth v. West, 357 Mass. 245,258 N.E.2d 22 (1970).
49. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 466, 467 N.E.2d at 112. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Chase, 372 Mass. 736, 363 N.E.2d 1105 (1977).
50. FED. R. EVID. 609(a) states in part:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has
been convicted ofa crime shall be admitted . . . only if the crime (1) was punish
able by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which
he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dis
honesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
[d.
A federal court held the discretion under Rule 609 to be reviewable in United States v.
Hendershot, 614 F.2d 648, 651 (9th Cir. 1980). For a list of states which have adopted or
rejected the rule, see State Correlation Tables, [Finding Aids Volume] FED. R. EVID.
SERVo (Callaghan 1979).
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a witness. 51 The rule contains restrictions, however, that regulate per
missible convictions 52 and that also carve out an exception to the rule
when a criminal defendant testifies. 53 First, the conviction must be
either on a charge equivalent to a federal felony 54 or for a crime in
volving dishonesty or untruthfulness. 55 No restrictions apply to the
latter class of conviction because of its high probative value for im
peachment. 56 The potential prejudice involved in the former class of
conviction, however, especially when a criminal defendant takes the
stand,57 led the committees involved in the Federal Rules to require
that the trial court weigh the probative value of the conviction against
its prejudicial effect before allowing it to be used against an accused. 58
In contrast, the language in Maguire neither expressly limits the
classes of convictions admissible nor does it limit the trial court's bal
ancing process to a particular type of witness. Although the supreme
judicial court noted that certain convictions-such as crimes substan
tially similar to the charge59 and convictions which do not affect un
truthfulness 60-may create a likelihood of prejudice, in Maguire it left
the determination of whether to admit convictions entirely to the dis
cretion of the trial court. 61 The only restrictions on the Maguire rule
lie in the defendant's right to appeal the exercise of a trial court's dis
cretion62 and in the express limitations contained in chapter 233, sec
tion 21. 63
51. FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
52. See id.
53. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(I).
54. Id.
55. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
56. See House, Senate, and Conference Committee Reports on FED. R. EVID. 609(a),
Rules of Evidence, [Finding Aids Volume] FED. R. EVID. SERVo (Callaghan 1979). Rule
609(a)(2) also allows the use of misdemeanor convictions involving untruthfulness or dis
honesty. See id.
57. See id. The reports can be read to narrow the exception to apply to only criminal
defendants. Id.
58. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(I); see House, Senate, and Conference Committee Reports
on FED. R. EVID. 609(a), Rules of Evidence, [Finding Aids Volume] FED. R. EVID. SERVo
(Callaghan 1979). Note that Rule 609(a)(I) requires that the prejudicial effect merely out
weigh the probative value, not substantially outweigh it. Cf FED. R. EVID. 403.
59. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 469, 467 N.E.2d at 115.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 470, 467 N.E.2d at 115. The court merely stated that discretion existed
under chapter 233, section 21 and that it is reviewable, nothing more. Id.
62. It should be pointed out that appellate review is also available to the defendant, if
in superior court, as an interlocutory appeal under MASS. R. CRIM. PRO. 15(b)(2). To
assure such an appeal, the motion to suppress the conviction must be in limine and be
decided before the trial begins. See MASS. R. CRIM. PRO. 15(c).
63. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21 (West 1959 & Supp. 1984). In its intro
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Arguably, the Maguire court reached a logical result when one
recognizes that the rule operates under a statute the purpose of which
is to allow the use of any conviction except those specifically ex
cluded. 64 The rule's lack of discernable boundaries, however, opens
the door for applications that could not occur under Rule 609(a).
Under Maguire, a trial court could conceivably allow the use of a mis
demeanor conviction not involving untruthfulness or dishonesty to im
peach a witness. At the other extreme, the trial court could exclude,
in a trial for embezzlement, a prior embezzlement conviction on the
grounds of "substantial similarity" to the charge. Furthermore,
Maguire places most of this power of application in the hands of the
trial judge, while Rule 609(a) restricts application in several areas.
The Maguire rule is also dissimilar on its face to Massachusetts
Proposed Rule of Evidence 609(a),65 rejected by the supreme judicial
court in 1983. 66 Like Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a), the proposed
rule advanced a probative value-prejudicial effect test only when a
criminal defendant was involved;67 it did not, however, place limits on
admissible convictions. 68 Maguire differs from both the proposed rule
and the federal rule in that it neither commands nor restricts the use of
a balancing test when the accused testifies. Although the court stated
that a balancing test will be used on appeal to judge whether the trial
court abused its discretion in admitting the conviction,69 it did not
expressly require the trial court to use a balancing test whenever the
accused's prior convictions are offered to impeach him. Moreover, the
ductory paragraph the statute states that as a general rule convictions may be admitted to
impeach the credibility of a witness; it then lists specific exceptions. The exceptions include
time limitations on the period a conviction may be used after it goes on record (misde
meanor-five years; felony-ten years), and an exclusion of traffic violations for which only
a fine was imposed. Id.
64. Id. See supra note 63.
65. MASS. PROP. R. EVID. 609(a) reads as follows:
For the purpose of impeaching the credibility of a witness, evidence that he
has been convicted of a crime is admissible. In a criminal case, the court shall
have the discretion to exclude evidence of a prior conviction offered to impeach
the credibility of the accused if it finds that its probative value is outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. There shall be no discretion to exclude a prior
conviction offered to impeach the credibility of any other witness. A plea of
guilty or a finding or verdict of guilty shall constitute a conviction.
Hughes, Evidence, 19 MASS. PRACfICE SERIES 376 (West Supp. 1981).
66. See SJC Rejects Evidence Code, 11 MASS. LAW. WEEKLY 457 (1983).
67. MASS. PROP. R. EVID. 609(a).
68. Id. The drafters of the proposed rule saw the rule as a compromise between the
need to protect an accused on the stand and the West court's interpretation of chapter 233,
section 21. See Advisory Committee's Note to MASS. PROP. R. EVID. 609(a), in Hughes,
Evidence, 19 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES 376-77 (West Supp. 1981).
69. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 470, 467 N.E.2d at 115.
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Maguire court did not limit the use of trial court discretion only to the
accused. Theoretically, a trial court after Maguire could exclude any
conviction offered to impeach any witness. 7o In addition, only a de
fendant witness would have the right to appeal the exercise of discre
tion.1 1 The Maguire court, by changing the interpretation of one word
in a statute, gave the trial court, in effect, more power than the drafters
of both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Massachusetts Pro
posed Rules of Evidence were willing to give it.72
Even when a criminal defendant is involved, the Maguire court's
application of its rule indicated that great deference will be given to
the trial court. In Maguire, the court was strongly inftuenced by the
fact that the trial court gave two limiting instructions about the prior
conviction. 73 Its analysis of the relationship between the prior convic
tion and the defendant's charge was superficial; the court failed to rec
ognize that many people (and juries) still might equate rape with sex
instead of violence. 74 If the court were to give similar scrutiny to other
defendants' appeals under the Maguire rule, "abuse of discretion" and.
"substantial similarity"7S might develop into large hurdles.
70. The theory arises from the fact that discretion under the statute exists without a
qualification other than "witness." See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21 (West 1959.
& Supp. 1984).
71. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 470, 467 N.E.2d at 115. "We will consider seasonably
raised challenges to the admission of evidence of prior convictions of a defendant who
testified at trial." /d. (emphasis added). In practice, the right of appeal will probably ex
tend only to criminal defendants, since many of the concerns about misuse diminish sub
stantially in a civil trial.
72. Another aspect of FED. R. EVID. 609(a) which illustrates the difference in the
discretionary power allocated to the trial court lies in the requirement that the trial court,
when weighing the probative value against the prejudicial effect, must make a record of its
findings and explicitly use the test in its ruling. See. e.g., United States v. Mahone, 537
F.2d 922, 928-29 (7th Cir. 1976). Trial judges in Massachusetts might be wise to follow the
procedure in order to ensure stability and protect their rulings.
.
73. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 470, 467 N.E.2d at 115.
74. Id. at 471, 467 N.E.2d at 116. "Substantially similar" is in the eyes of the be
holder. The supreme judicial court ignored any possible confusion the jury might have had
about the natures ofthe two convictions. Arguably, however, the problem could have been
corrected by the trial court's limiting instructions.
75. The Maguire court's use of these labels without clarifications, however, also in
troduces the possibility that the defendant will abuse the rule if confronted with a sympa- .
thetic trial judge. Maguire gives almost absolute power to a trial court to apply its·
discretion as it wishes, subject only to a deferential appellate review. A balanced applica
tion of Maguire by a trial judge will ensure that Maguire's goal of fairness to the defendant
will be preserved. An uneven application of the rule, however, might tend either to allow
the defendant to cripple the prosecution's cross-examination or to allow the prosecution to
use questionable convictions (such as the prior conviction in Maguire). The Maguire court
tried to construct safeguards against abuse by giving appellate review to the defendant and·
by giving potential limits on the defendant's challenges to admission to the prosecution.
See supra notes 70 & 71 and accompanying text. The use of checks, however, still depends
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Other aspects of the opinion make it of limited benefit to a crimi
nal defendant. First, in a footnote the court stated that if a defendant
sought to exclude a prior conviction, the judge could condition the
exclusion on the defendant's agreement not to impeach Common
wealth witnesses similarly.76 Second, the trial court would not have to
consider the circumstances of the conviction in its ruling on admissi
bility,77 although the rule permits such consideration. 78 Massachu
setts courts, however, permit no evidence of circumstances to explain
the conviction other than what the record contains. 79 Both factors, in
addition to a deferential review by the supreme judicial court, indicate
a rule that, despite its apparently broad language, will be restrictive in
application.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Maguire holding can be characterized as the supreme judicial
court's attempt at a definitive solution to an evidence rule which has
produced many constitutional challenges and unsettling questions
about its fairness. so The Maguire rule provides the last assurance
needed to guarantee a fair application of the rule: discretion provides
a check on prejudice and appellate review provides a check on the
abuse of the discretion. Although the rule's language is broader than
that of most jurisdictions and contains few limits on admissible convic
tions, the rule in practice promises to be restrictive in other areas.
Maguire's use in trial and appellate courts will ensure that prior con
victions will be admitted only when prejudicial questions have been
eliminated. The prejudice involved, however, will have to be substan
on the trial court. See Maguire, 392 Mass. at 470-71 & nn.9-lO, 467 N.E.2d at 115-16 &
nn.9-1O.
.
76. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 470 n.9, 467 N.E.2d at 115 n.9. The court indicated,
however, that the condition may be limited by constitutional barriers such as the right to
confrontation of witnesses under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution.
Id.
77. Id. at 471 n.lO, 467 N.E.2d at 115-16 n.lO. The defendant in Maguire offered to
describe the circumstances of the crime, which involved homosexual rather than heterosex
ual propositions to women who were intended to relay them to football team members. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. See Lamoureux v. N.Y., N. H. & H. R.R., 169 Mass. 338, 340,47 N.E. 1009,
1010 (1897).
80. The following cases have dealt with and rejected constitutional challenges to the
West rule under either the state or federal constitution; Maguire, 392 Mass. 466, 467
N.E.2d 112; Knight, 392 Mass. 192, 465 N.E.2d 771; King, 391 Mass. 691, 463 N.E.2d
1168; Diaz, 383 Mass. 73,417 N.E.2d 950; Chase, 372 Mass. 736, 363 N.E.2d 1105; Com
monwealth v. Dimarzo, 364 Mass. 669, 308 N.E.2d 538 (1974). On the question of unfair
ness, See Chase, 372 Mass. 736, 363 N.E.2d 1105; DiMarzo, 364 Mass. 669, 308 N.E.2d
538.
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tial in order to exclude the convictions, despite the rule's broad
language.
Kevin C. McGee

